A recent paper [1] suggests that Deep Neural Networks can be protected from gradient-based adversarial perturbations by driving the network activations into a highly saturated regime. Here we analyse such saturated networks and show that the attacks fail due to numerical limitations in the gradient computations. A simple stabilisation of the gradient estimates enables successful and efficient attacks. Thus, it has yet to be shown that the robustness observed in [1] is not simply due to numerical limitations.
Training
Sigmoid Histogram over the elements of the gradients of the input image with respect to the cross-entropy loss (the direction of the adversarial perturbation) for both the vanilla sigmoid MLP (left) and the saturated sigmoid MLP (right). In the saturated network more then 98% of the gradient elements are exactly zero while the rest is sixteen orders of magnitude smaller then in the vanilla network.
exactly zero, compared to none in the vanilla network. At the same time, all non-zero elements are sixteen orders of magnitude smaller the gradient elements of the vanilla network, suggesting that the residual gradients of the saturated network are due to rounding errors or are susceptible to numerical instabilities. For 97,9% of the images exactly all elements of the gradient are zero. In this case FGSM applies absolutely no perturbation to the corresponding image and the attack is inadvertently unsuccessful. For all other images the FGSM attack was successful in 62% of the cases.
The overall success rate of FGSM is directly related to the number of zero-valued gradients. In Figure 2 we plot the success of FGSM and the ratio of non-zero gradients as a function of the gain. For gains below 10 −3 FGSM is highly successful (as evaluated on the saturated sigmoid MLP with gain 1). For larger gains, however, zero-valued gradients start to appear. Unsurprisingly, the success rate of FGSM strongly decreases with the number of zero-valued gradients.
It is straight-forward to attack saturated networks through a simple trick that allows more stable gradient estimates. To this end we note that in highly saturated networks a modest reduction in the gain of the sigmoids barely change the activations (they will still be close to zero and one) but can significantly increase the numerical stability of the gradient estimates. We then use this gradient to generate an adversarial example according to the usual FGSM procedure and use it as an input to the original saturated network. As can be seen in Table 1 , this simple modification of FGSM is highly successful in fooling the saturated network. For saturated ReLU MLPs we observed a saturation of the softmax and devised a similar attack by down-scaling the activations of the readout layer (Table 1) .
Taken together, we demonstrated that the robustness observed in [1] likely originates from the numerical instabilities of gradient computations in highly saturated networks. A simple stabilisation of the gradient computations still allow standard gradient-based adversarial attack methods to succeed. While we cannot say with certainty that the same attack succeeds for the networks analysed in [1] (without access to the source code we cannot exclude unintended differences in the implementation and the network parameters), it has yet to be shown that the robustness observed in [1] does not originate from numerical limitations. More generally, our findings highlight the critical importance of choosing the most suitable methods to challenge the robustness of the network. Figure S1: (a) Sigmoid MLP Weight and activation distribution for both the vanilla (top) and saturated (bottom) network. We observe a qualitatively similar increase in the kurtosis of the weights and the bimodality of the activations as in [1] . (b) ReLU MLP Same as (a) but for ReLU nonlinearities. Similar to [1] the activations are not bimodal as in the sigmoid MLP but feature a high kurtosis.
